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JONATHAN ANOMALY*
ABSTRACT
The widespread use of antibiotics in medicine and agriculture is encouraging
the proliferation of antibiotic-resistant infections around the world. Our use of
antibiotics is a global, inter-generational collective action problem. Public
policies intended to solve the problem involve difficult moral tradeoffs.
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INTRODUCTION
Antibiotics make modern medicine possible, but the more we use them the
less effective they become. When appropriately prescribed, antibiotics confer
visible benefits: they cure bacterial infections that our immune systems struggle
with, and they enable us to undergo complex surgeries that would otherwise kill
us by exposing our internal organs to a bacterial world for which they are
unprepared. Yet the unseen effects on our microbial environment make our
choice to use antibiotics a morally weighty one. The more we use antibiotics,
the more likely we are to turn ourselves into vectors for antibiotic-resistant
bacteria that are difficult or impossible to treat.
* Lecturer in the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics program, Duke University. © 2017, Jonathan
Anomaly.
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Apart from antibiotic resistance, increasing evidence suggests that by rou-
tinely giving antibiotics to children and altering their microbiome, we elevate
their risk of acquiring autoimmune disorders ranging from allergies and asthma
to Crohn’s disease and Type 1 diabetes. Sometimes the absence of particular
microbes at critical developmental stages leads the immune system to target the
body’s own cells in an effort to find and destroy the kinds of microbes it
evolved to anticipate. I review the evidence for these claims, discuss the moral
issues they raise, and then turn to policy proposals aimed at mitigating the
problem.
Just as using antibiotics affects our microbial environment in ways that are
not immediately obvious, policies to control antibiotic resistance and fight
infectious diseases can produce welfare consequences that are surprising to
scientists, invisible to the general public, and hard for policymakers to predict
with much precision. Thoughtful approaches to problems raised by the wide-
spread use of antibiotics should recognize both the importance and limitations
of policy solutions. To paraphrase the French economist Frederic Bastiat, the
myopic policymaker confines himself to thinking about the visible and immedi-
ate consequences of public policies, but the prescient policymaker keeps an eye
on their unseen and distant effects.1
I. BIOLOGICAL WAR AND HUMAN HEALTH
A. The Anatomy of Resistance
We live in a bacterial world. It is estimated that the average person hosts
about thirty-nine trillion bacteria, many of them in our gut.2 Most of these
bacteria have forged a symbiotic, or co-dependent, relationship with us. Some
bacteria that we house in our gut and on our skin are along for a free ride: they
use us for shelter and feed off the scraps of food we consume. These commensal
bacteria usually do us no harm, and occasionally do us a favor by crowding out
pathogenic bacteria. Other bacteria have a mutualistic relationship with us: they
extract benefits but also give back by synthesizing vitamins, modulating our
immune system, and even affecting hormones and neurotransmitters that control
our appetite. Very few of the bacteria around us are parasites that make us sick
when they find a way into our body. Even parasitic bacteria are typically benign
in the presence of other bacteria, unless they invade certain parts of our body
and multiply too fast for our immune system to destroy.
Most parasitic bacteria do not kill their host since this can be an evolutionary
death sentence: biting the hand that feeds you is a risky strategy for increasing
1. FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, What is Seen and What is Not Seen (1848), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Seymour Cain trans., 1995), http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html
[https://perma.cc/UQ62-SZNS].
2. Ron Sender et al., Revised Estimates for the Number of Human and Bacterial Cells in the Body,
PLOS BIOLOGY (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/036103 [https://perma.cc/2DBT-PB5A].
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your long-run food supply.3 But many bacteria make us seriously ill, or increase
our morbidity when we have other diseases or when our immune system is
weak. It is against these bacteria—the ones that kill us or make us sick—that
antibiotics act as a crucial weapon that can save and extend life, or make life
more comfortable by shortening the duration of an infection.
Antibiotic resistance occurs when a bacterium acquires the ability to resist the
deleterious effects of antibiotics. Resistance can originate from the mutation of
a gene on a bacterial chromosome or from the lateral transfer of genes from
one bacterium to another. Mutations typically arise from random copying errors
during cell division or from exposure to radiation, whereas lateral gene transfer
occurs when bacteria swap genes with other bacteria or with viruses that
parasitize them. Lateral gene transfer is a clever way for bacteria to acquire new
genes without sexual reproduction. Sex may be fun, but the vertical transfer of
genes from parents to children is costly: eukaryotes who reproduce sexually
only transfer half of our genes to our offspring, and can only draw from the
genetic novelty of a few partners in any given generation.4
By contrast, bacteria can acquire genes from other bacteria (by “conjuga-
tion”) and viruses (by “transduction”) in their environment. Since viruses,
bacteria, and free-floating strands of DNA around bacteria are all potential
sources of genetic change, some refer to this environment as a metagenome
from which bacteria can manufacture new tools to resist antibiotics.5
Antibiotics typically work by disabling a bacterium’s ability to repair or
replicate itself. While most of the random mutations or plasmids bacteria pick
up from their environment are either harmful or neutral, some genetic novelties
allow bacteria to defend themselves from antibiotics. The main defense mecha-
nisms include extra thick cell walls, enzymes that transform antibiotics into
harmless chemicals, and efflux pumps that flush antibiotics out of the cell.6
Bacteria have waged a three-and-a-half billion-year war against one another,
so antibiotics have been around for a long time. More recently, plants, animals,
and fungi evolved their own endogenous antibiotics, but only in the last century
have people discovered how to turn these naturally occurring compounds into
medicine. The ancient origin and ubiquity of antibiotics and antibiotic resistance
strongly suggests that new, synthetically created antibiotics will not be much
3. This is true of both viruses and bacteria: the virulence of a parasite tends to decline as it
co-evolves with its host over many generations. See generally DOROTHY CRAWFORD, THE INVISIBLE
ENEMY (2000). A counterexample to this general rule is cholera, which uses its host to spread billions of
copies of itself by inducing it to involuntarily empty its fluids near local water supplies, allowing it to
be consumed by others who drink the water.
4. The best general account of the origin and evolutionary benefits of sexual reproduction IS MATT
RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (2003). See also NICK LANE, POWER,
SEX, SUICIDE: MITOCHONDRIA AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (2005).
5. NICK LANE, THE VITAL QUESTION: ENERGY, EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGIN OF COMPLEX LIFE 180–81
(2015).
6. For an overview of common resistance mechanisms, see STUART LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX:
HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS DESTROYS THEIR CURATIVE POWER 71–114 (2002).
2017] 1001ETHICS, ANTIBIOTICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
better or longer lasting than those antibiotics that already exist. According to
Brad Spellberg, former President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America,
“microbes have most likely invented antibiotics against every biochemical
target that can be attacked—and, of necessity, developed resistance mechanisms
to protect all those biochemical targets. Indeed, widespread antibiotic resistance
was recently discovered among bacteria found in underground caves that had
been geologically isolated from the surface of the planet for four million years.
Remarkably, resistance was found even to synthetic antibiotics that did not exist
on earth until the 20th century.”7
As I will argue in the next two sections, this fact has significant implications
for how to conceptualize antibiotic resistance (as a permanent arms race), and
how to think about the most effective ways of addressing the problem (for
example, if the efficacy of traditional antibiotics necessarily declines with
increased use, we should shift resources and attention to preventing infections
with vaccines, and to developing novel treatments like phage therapy).
Understanding antibiotic resistance as an evolutionary arms race helps ex-
plain why it is found virtually everywhere, but it does not explain how difficult
it is to eliminate resistance once it arises. A number of remarkable studies from
the late 20th century show that natural selection often takes a long time to
eliminate bacteria with resistance genes, even after removing antibiotics from
the environment.8 This result is especially surprising since the energetic cost to
bacteria of expressing a gene is up to 200,000 times that of their more complex
eukaryotic cousins.9 If it is energetically burdensome to express a gene, bacteria
should be under constant pressure to streamline their genome by shedding genes
that impose fitness costs, such that any genes for antibiotic resistance should be
punished in an antibiotic-free environment.
Two factors mitigate the cost of retaining resistance genes. First, some genes
are only conditionally expressed in the presence of chemical cues like antibiot-
ics. In these cases, retaining a gene for antibiotic resistance that becomes
(temporarily) useless when antibiotics are removed carries almost no cost at all
since the gene does not squander energy by creating pointless proteins. But if
the bacterium is exposed again to antibiotics, these genes can re-activate
resistance and confer enormous reproductive benefits at minimal cost.
Second, genes that confer resistance to one kind of antibiotic are often
genetically linked to other resistance genes, and sometimes to genes unrelated
7. Brad Spellberg, The Future of Antibiotic Resistance, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299, 299–302 (2013).
8. Dan Andersson, The Biological Cost of Mutational Antibiotic Resistance, 9 CURRENT OPINION
MICROBIOLOGY 461 (2006); Richard Lenski. Bacterial Evolution and the Cost of Antibiotic Resistance, 1
INT’L MICROBIOLOGY 265 (1998); Abigail Salyers et al., Why are Antibiotic Resistance Genes So
Resistant to Elimination?, 41 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS AND CHEMOTHERAPY 2321 (1997).
9. The reason is that bacteria lack mitochondria, which are organelles that make complex life
possible by providing an extremely efficient source of energy. See Lane, supra note 5, at 173.
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to resistance.10 One of the more disturbing things about resistance is that the
longer bacteria are exposed to antibiotics, the cheaper it gets for them to carry
resistance genes.11 This is a consequence of evolution by natural selection: over
time, bacteria find novel ways—through mutation or lateral gene transfer—to
economize the energy required to stave off threats posed by antibiotics. Still,
according to a recent meta-analysis, most resistance genes impose some costs
on bacteria, so withdrawing antibiotics from an environment is likely to eventu-
ally minimize and perhaps eliminate most resistance genes.12
An important consequence of the long persistence of resistance genes in a
bacterial population is that antibiotic resistance is not a typical pollution prob-
lem like mercury in the atmosphere or arsenic in ground water: it does not go
away quickly after the source of pollution is addressed. Antibiotic resistance is
more like anthropogenic global warming or ozone depletion: In these cases, the
effects of the chemicals that cause the relevant problem take quite a while to
cease having an effect. Moreover, unlike some kinds of pollution, antibiotic
resistance cannot be stopped—even if we took the counterproductive step of
eliminating the use of all antibiotics. Antibiotic resistance can only be mini-
mized and mitigated through responsible use.
B. The Cost of Resistance
Antibiotic resistance is a moral problem because using antibiotics imposes a
probabilistic benefit or harm on other people. Each of us has a trivial effect on
the microbial environment around us, but our collective use of antibiotics has
morally significant consequences. Our choice to use antibiotics is a lot like our
choice of whether to vote for a particular candidate in a large election, or to
reduce the amount of pollution we release into the atmosphere: none of us has
an appreciable impact, but the aggregate effect of our choices has important
consequences for human welfare.
Resistant infections can be difficult or expensive to treat, and in some cases
cause the premature death of patients—either because second-line treatments
are too expensive or because they don’t exist. According to a recent estimate by
the British Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, at least 700,000 people die
every year from resistant infections, and that number is expected to rise
considerably in the coming decades.13 Antibiotics are saving many more lives
than antibiotic resistance is ending, so this number is not by itself informative.
But since resistance is partly under our control, the number can be changed
based on our personal choices and public policies.
10. Dan Andersson et al., Antibiotic Resistance and its Cost: Is it Possible to Reverse Resistance?, 8
NATURE REVS. 260 (2010).
11. Id.
12. Anita Melnyk et al., The Fitness Costs of Antibiotic Resistance Mutations, 8 EVOLUTIONARY
APPLICATIONS 273 (2014).
13. Jim O’Neill et al., Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations,
REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (2016), http://amr-review.org/ [https://perma.cc/FJM4-6QBS].
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In addition to the problem of premature deaths, the economic cost of resis-
tance is staggering: it is already in the trillions worldwide, and is expected to
grow to an estimated 100 trillion dollars by 2050 if trends continue.14 Costs
include the money spent on additional treatments of resistant infections by
health care systems, insurance companies, and individuals, and also include lost
productivity due to illness or death caused by resistant infections. Again, this
means projected costs can be altered by altering consumption patterns, by
public policies that determine who pays for health care and how benefits are
allocated, and by policies that aim to control resistance by restricting access or
developing new treatments.
Regardless of the specific estimates, there is widespread consensus among
infectious disease experts that the problem is getting worse, and at an accelerat-
ing rate.15 This is partly because demand for antibiotics is rising around the
world along with rising incomes, and additionally because this increasing
wealth is creating higher demand for meat, which increasingly comes from
animals raised on factory farms.
About half of all antibiotics worldwide go directly into animal feed, and this
number is growing fast.16 While gains to farmers from adding antibiotics to
animal feed to speed growth are small, even these limited gains create a
prisoner’s dilemma in which the rational, profit-maximizing strategy makes
everyone worse off than they would be with restrictions on antibiotic use.
Antibiotics are also likely required to prevent illness and death on factory farms
where animals are densely packed into spaces that are ideal environments for
the spread of infectious diseases.17 Since we share many microbes with other
animals, and resistance to different kinds of antibiotics is either genetically
linked or easily spreads between different species of bacteria through lateral
gene transfer, the problem of antibiotics in agriculture threatens not just the
health and welfare of animals, but also people. People who work in agriculture
can be vectors for spreading resistant infections, but so too can the meat we
consume, the produce that is fertilized with waste from animals on factory
farms, and the water and sewage that runs from factory farms into the surround-
ing environment.
As we will see in the policy section, antibiotics in many developing countries—
especially China, India, and Pakistan—are available to consumers without
prescription.18 Because of easy availability and low cost, antibiotic use in
14. Id. at 4.
15. Nearly every paper cited in this essay contains evidence for this claim. Perhaps the best general
overview of expert opinion is HELEN GELBAND ET AL., THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S ANTIBIOTICS,
https://cddep.org/sites/default/files/swa_2015_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JS9-H5WB].
16. T.P. van Boeckel et al., Global Trends in Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals 112 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 5649 (2015).
17. Jonathan Anomaly, What’s Wrong with Factory Farming, 8 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 246 (2015).
18. Even when laws require prescription, poor institutions and corruption can lead to virtual
over-the-counter availability. See Peter Collignon et al., Antimicrobial Resistance: The Major Contribu-
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agriculture is accelerating in developing countries faster than it is shrinking in
Europe and the US.19 It is finally beginning to decline in the US due to
increasing consumer demand for antibiotic-free meat, and threats of regulation
from agencies like the US Food and Drug Administration.20 Since developing
countries also have the greatest population growth, and can least afford more
advanced second line therapies, it is likely that both the source and the burden
of antibiotic resistance will shift toward poorer countries in the coming decades.
C. When Treatments Cause Disease
This paper will principally focus on the tradeoffs of different policy solutions
to growing antibiotic resistance. But there is one more important respect in
which antibiotics affect human health apart from curing bacterial infections or
spurring antibiotic resistance. According to the “hygiene hypothesis” proposed
in the late twentieth century, the global surge in autoimmune diseases can be
traced partly to the fact that children in industrialized countries grow up in
relatively sterile environments. An increasing number of studies corroborate this
hypothesis.
The correlation between Caesarian sections in women and autoimmune
disorders in their children is among the most intriguing sources of evidence.
According to a recent meta-analysis, C-sections seem to increase the risk of
allergies and autoimmune disorders like Type 1 diabetes.21 Microbiologist
Martin Blaser argues:
[T]hroughout the animal kingdom, mothers transfer microbes to their young
while giving birth . . . . This microbial handoff is also a critical aspect of
infant health in humans. Today it is in peril . . . . The high rate of Caesarian
sections and the overuse of antibiotics in mothers and newborns are altering
the types of microbial species that mothers have always passed on to their
newborns.22
For example, some beneficial bacteria—such as lactobacilli, which newborns
pick up when passing from the sterile womb through the bacteria-rich birth
canal—provide protection from pathogenic microbes.
tion of Poor Governance and Corruption to this Growing Problem, PLOS ONE (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pone.0116746 [https://perma.cc/9G3L-KWUM].
19. GELBAND et al., supra note 15, at 38–49.
20. Id.
21. See J. Neu et al., Caesarian Versus Vaginal Delivery: long-term infant outcomes and the hygiene
hypothesis, 38 CLINICAL PERINATOLOGY 321 (2011).
22. MARTIN BLASER, MISSING MICROBES: HOW THE OVERUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS IS FUELING OUR MODERN
PLAGUES 90 (2015).
2017] 1005ETHICS, ANTIBIOTICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
More importantly, some bacteria (as well as some viruses, worms, and other
microbes) prime the immune system to deal with future threats.23 Removing
these can trigger a developing child’s immune system to target its own cells
rather than the parasitic microbes it evolved to encounter. According to Martin
Blaser, our innate immunity, which is more strictly controlled by genetics,
should be distinguished from our adaptive immunity, which enables our im-
mune system to learn to distinguish self from non-self and friend from foe.
Continual antibiotic use from an early age raises the probability that a child will
eventually develop diseases like Celiac, Type 1 diabetes, Crohn’s, and a variety
of allergies.24 Yet Americans born in the 1990s will have had, on average,
seventeen courses of antibiotics by age twenty, and thirty by age forty.25
One way to think about the hygiene hypothesis is that the absence rather than
presence of some bacteria can cause disease: what begin as parasites evolve into
mutualists to which our bodies outsource part of our immunity. A vivid analogy
can be made between the loss of endogenous vitamin-c production and the loss
of certain kinds of innate immunity:
At some point in our evolutionary past . . . as we gorged on a vitamin-c rich
diet, our own vitamin-c manufacturing genes became non-functional . . . the
primate lineage outsourced vitamin-c production to plants. Now transpose the
model to immune functioning. Contact with another organism . . . develops
your immune regulatory circuits. Over evolutionary time, the ability to regu-
late immune function yourself dulls or disappears. Losing this capacity incurs
no immediate cost . . . you’ve just outsourced your immunoregulation to mi-
crobes. Now you’re dependent on them.26
Widespread use of antibiotics can both cure and create diseases in ourselves and
in other people. This raises a difficult moral problem to conceptualize and
address.
II. MORAL PROBLEMS
The availability of antibiotics in modern medicine and animal agriculture
creates a global, intergenerational collective action problem. Each choice to
prescribe or consume antibiotics has a trivial impact on ourselves and our
microbial environment, but all of our choices, taken together, affect the welfare
of current and future people. The collective action problems associated with
preserving the efficacy of existing antibiotics and incentivizing the production
of new treatments are a permanent part of our evolutionary arms race with
pathogenic microbes, so the problem can only be mitigated rather than solved.
23. MOISES VELASQUEZ-MANOFF, AN EPIDEMIC OF ABSENCE: A NEW WAY OF UNDERSTANDING ALLERGIES
AND AUTOIMMUNE DISEASES (2013).
24. BLASER, supra note 22.
25. Id. at 71.
26. VELASQUEZ-MANOFF, supra note 23, at 113.
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Because the benefits of using antibiotics are mostly internalized (when they
cure a bacterial infection) but the costs are socialized (in the form of resistance),
patients and farmers overuse antibiotics, and physicians and veterinarians over-
prescribe them. One problem with thinking through the moral dimensions of
antibiotic resistance is that our actions usually only produce a small probability
of harm (apart from their immediate potential benefits). Another problem is that,
given current technology, it is virtually impossible to trace the emergence or
spread of a resistance gene to a particular actor. In other words, the harms are
probabilistic and invisible, and it is unclear who (if anyone) bears responsibility
for spreading any particular strain of resistance.27
Actions that tend to increase antibiotic resistance should be thought of as
contributing to a process in which genetic pollution accumulates in the environ-
ment. When we consume antibiotics—whether or not they are appropriately
taken—the environment is mostly our own body, but we also share bacteria with
those around us. When veterinarians or physicians prescribe large amounts of
antibiotics, the environment is other people’s bodies, and through their bodies
the broader microbial environment. In all of these cases, even when antibiotics
are used appropriately and cure an infection—thus benefitting both the infected
person and those around him—their aggregate use tends to create long-run
social costs by increasing resistance. The fact that the costs are invisible and
probabilistic rather than visible and discrete may help explain why so many
people are ignorant of the problem. A deeper explanation owes to our implicit
understanding that, for large scale collective action problems, our individual
actions have very little impact on the outcome.
As economists since Anthony Downs have argued, people tend to have
poorly formed beliefs about subjects that require significant investments of time
or energy when their effort is unlikely to make a difference to solving the
problem.28 When I buy a can of soup or a pint of beer, I have good reason to
make sure it doesn’t contain toxic pollutants since I would bear that cost
directly. But people who consume meat from animals fed antibiotics have little
incentive to understand how this choice elevates the risk of disease and death.
Consumers are, in many cases, rationally ignorant of these problems.29 The
incentives surrounding public goods problems like preserving the efficacy of
antibiotics do not excuse consumer ignorance, but they do help explain it.
When responsibility for a problem is diffuse and difficult to detect, and when
our individual actions are neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about an
27. Jasper Littmann et al., The Ethical Significance of Antimicrobial Resistance, 8 PUB. HEALTH
ETHICS 209, 211 (2015). Notice that we cannot directly create resistant strains of bacteria (except
perhaps through genetic engineering), but we can create conditions that make the emergence and spread
of resistance more likely—e.g., on factory farms or in hospitals.
28. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135
(1957).
29. Most people do not know the difference between a virus and a bacterium, and among those who
do, many falsely believe that their immune system rather than bacteria become resistant to antibiotics.
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undesirable outcome, our obligations seem to change. As Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong argues in the case of burning fossil fuels that contribute to global
warming, each of us has a negligible effect on the problem and so does not
cause it (even if we contribute to it).30 If I disappeared, the globe would still
warm or cool at about the same rate.
Changing our individual consumption of antibiotics may be prudent, and
socially beneficial, but is not likely to alter the global microbial environment
much or cause other people to change their behavior. Discussing the problem
with others is arguably more important than changing our own behavior—at
least if our beliefs are justified and we are reasonably good at persuasion.
Perhaps the ultimate moral obligation for those who understand the problem is
to figure out how to explain the structure of the problem to other people, and to
try to influence social norms and public policies to move in a direction that
increases the extent to which individually rational behavior is socially benefi-
cial, or at least not socially harmful.
III. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Antibiotic resistance is one of the most urgent problems humanity faces, and
lawmakers are finally starting to take notice. The White House commissioned a
task force in 2014 and issued a report on the problem in 2015.31 Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom David Cameron also created a commission in 2014,
which published the comprehensive Review on Antimicrobial Resistance in
2016.32 Just before the British publication, a bacterial plasmid resistant to
nearly all known antibiotics was found in factory farmed pigs and people in
China33 and a few months later in the United States.34
A. Supply
Many scholars have weighed-in on how to best address resistance. To those
unfamiliar with the issue, it might seem puzzling that antibiotic development
has not kept pace with the rise in resistance. After all, pharmaceutical firms can
apparently profit from developing new drugs to treat infections that resist old
drugs. Of course, these firms have developed new drugs, but most experts agree
30. WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obliga-
tions, in 5 ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES: PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, ETHICS 293–315 (2005).
31. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT BACTERIA (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/national_action_plan_for_combating_antibotic-
resistant_bacteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2YF-WHB5].
32. O’Neill et al., supra note 13.
33. Yi-Yun Liu et al., Emergence of Plasmid-Mediated Colistin Resistance Mechanism MCR-1 in
Animals and Human Beings in China, 16 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 161 (2016).
34. According to the US Centers for Disease Control, the MCR-1 gene was recently found for the
first time in an American patient with a common e. coli urinary tract infection. U.S. Dep’t Health Hum.
Servs, Discovery of First MCR-1 Gene in E. Coli Bacteria Found in a Human in United States,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2016/s0531-mcr-1.html [https://perma.cc/ZT99-6WHJ].
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that resistance has outpaced the development of new drugs. Several explana-
tions have been offered.
One explanation is that many early drugs—including most versions of
penicillin—were extracted from common plants and fungi and so were easier to
discover and cheaper to produce than synthetically created drugs, which require
costly research and development. There is consequently a longer delay between
when a particular kind of resistance emerges and when a new synthetic drug is
created to address it.35 A related explanation is that off-patent antibiotics still
work for some infections, since antibiotic resistance typically comes in degrees
rather than being an all-or-nothing fact about bacteria. This means that patented
drugs compete with much cheaper generic drugs, so the market for more
expensive patented antibiotics is considerably smaller than the generic market.
In fact, pharmacies often give away generic drugs for free to get people in the
door, and farmers buy these drugs in bulk at very low prices to add them to
animal feed.36
Another common explanation for why resistance outpaces new antibiotic
development is that companies must clear burdensome regulatory hurdles in
order to get new drugs approved. But while approval is expensive, safety and
efficacy testing is required for lots of drugs, not just antibiotics, so this
explanation is unconvincing.37
The most plausible explanation is that new synthetic drugs and novel ap-
proaches to antibiotic resistance require basic science research that cannot be
patented. Even when it can be patented, insights derived from basic science
research often take years to discover. Pharmaceutical firms can last for a long
time, but they are run by people with much shorter time horizons, so it may not
be desirable to executives or shareholders for the firm to invest in the prospect
of a payoff that comes much later.
This suggests a potential market failure, and a public goods rationale for
government intervention.38 If the social value of new antibiotic drugs or novel
approaches to the problem of resistance is not reflected in drug prices or the
amount firms spend on research, perhaps governments can improve outcomes
by allocating more money to basic science research.39 Governments are in a
unique position to finance research carried out by universities and laboratories
that compete for grants. But private firms are in a much better position, and
have better incentives, to translate basic science research into new drugs and
treatments.
35. Kim Lewis, Platforms for Antibiotic Discovery, 12 NATURE REV. 375 (2013).
36. Kevin Outterson et al., Repairing the Broken Market for Antibiotic Innovation, 34 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 278 (2015). In 2015, a popular pharmacy chain in the United States (CVS Drugs) had a
campaign advertising “Free antibiotics—14 day supply!” at many of their stores.
37. GELBAND et al., supra note 15, are also unconvinced for this reason.
38. But how much intervention, if any, raises moral questions about the proper role of government.
See Jonathan Anomaly, Public Goods and Government Action, 14 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 109 (2015).
39. Brad Spellberg et al., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Policy Recommendations to Save
Lives, 52(5) INFECTIOUS DISEASE SOC’Y OF AM. PUB. IDSA POL., 416 (2011).
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Other proposals for stimulating new drug development include offering
prizes for specific drug types, and wildcard patent term extensions. The idea of
prizes is simple. Policymakers (or scientists working for a government task
force) would identify the need for an urgent treatment and create a prize that
reflects an amount somewhere between the private costs and social benefits
associated with the new treatment. The government would award the prize to
the first company to develop the treatment.
Wildcard patent term extensions (or “transferable vouchers”)40 work by
offering firms the opportunity to extend the patent term on a drug they already
manufacture by a few years in exchange for developing new antibiotics. While
some drugs are extremely profitable for pharmaceutical firms to produce and
others are not, profitability does not always accurately measure social value. We
can allow firms to make large profits on some drugs in exchange for producing
other drugs deemed more socially valuable by policymakers. Brad Spellberg
thinks we should experiment with this idea.41 A problem with wildcard patent
term extensions is that, even if they stimulate new drug development, they may
be a relatively unfair and inefficient tool.
Wildcards operate as a kind of implicit tax on the consumption of whatever
patented drug a pharmaceutical firm profits most from, since it extends the
length of time over which that firm can reap monopoly profits. The patented
drug may be an important blood pressure medication or a treatment for an
autoimmune disease, and a patent term extension for those drugs creates a real
welfare loss for patients who depend on them. Extending patent terms for
antibiotics themselves, rather than offering transferable patent term extensions,
also has costs, since it may encourage firms to sell the drug at high prices in the
first few years after invention and then sell it at extremely low prices in the last
few years as resistance to the drug rises, and other drugs that compete with it
emerge.42 The net effect of this is hard to calculate, and almost certainly varies
between drugs, and depends on contingencies that policy makers are unlikely to
understand in any detail.
A potential social cost associated with prizes and transferable patent term
extensions is what economists call rent-seeking, which occurs when private
actors lobby government agents to decrease competition, increase regulations
faced by competitors, or simply ask for handouts. Firms typically couch their
pleas for government favors in the language of social welfare, so it will always
be difficult to figure out whether a patent prize is the right size, or appropriately
awarded. The more discretion we give policymakers to make these determina-
tions, the more we encourage rent-seeking. This suggests a rule of thumb for
40. This is the name given to the idea in the recent British Review on Antimicrobial Resistance.
O’Neill et al., supra note 13.
41. Brad Spellberg, RISING PLAGUE: THE GLOBAL THREAT FROM DEADLY BACTERIA AND OUR DWINDLING
ARSENAL TO FIGHT THEM (2009).
42. Kevin Outterson et al., Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public Health? 7 THE
LANCET 559, 562 (2007).
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public policy akin to Occam’s Razor in the natural sciences: if there is a simpler
way to achieve the same result, it is generally preferable. Not because simplicity
is inherently good, but because complex rules and decision procedures offer
more opportunities for bureaucrats and politicians to exploit the (rational)
ignorance of citizens in order to use policy to enrich themselves rather than
benefit citizens and consumers.
B. Demand
There appears to be little downside to providing public funding for basic
scientific research other than the opportunity cost of using the money in
alternative ways.43 This makes it different than other policies like subsidizing
particular kinds of drugs, which can encourage rent-seeking. But unless it is
paired with efforts to limit consumption, investing more to stimulate the supply
of new drugs may just accelerate the arms race between bacteria and antibiotics.
In fact, according to a recent report, supply is less problematic than demand:
“contrary to a view that predominates in policy discussions, the antibiotic
pipeline is healthy and continually producing antibiotics. Insufficient attention
has been paid to developing incentives to conserve the existing universe of
antibiotics.”44 Promoting conservation does not just mean exercising more care
when consuming existing antibiotics; it also involves encouraging the develop-
ment of alternative ways of preventing, diagnosing, and treating infections so
that antibiotics are needed less.
The most obvious way to limit demand for antibiotics is to restrict access. By
far the easiest, most important, and least controversial thing governments can do
is to make antibiotics accessible only by prescription. As I have argued else-
where, antibiotics may be the only drug that should require a prescription, since
they are arguably the only kind of drug that substantially impacts the welfare of
others.45 Many relatively poor countries around the world mete out severe
penalties for using or selling recreational drugs, yet allow citizens to buy
antibiotics over the counter. Nothing could be further from a liberal policy,
which grants adults the right to use their own bodies as they see fit, but not the
right to use their bodies as biological weapons. Under pressure from Western
governments, developing countries like India have started becoming serious
about imposing restrictions on antibiotic use.46 One problem with these policies
is that government corruption and limited budgets may make them difficult to
enforce. Internet pharmacies exacerbate the problem of black markets for
43. Even if we think governments should be much smaller than they are, and perform far fewer
functions, funding for basic science research will—up to a point—be among the most effective and
mutually beneficial things governments can do.
44. GELBAND et al., supra note 15, at 60.
45. Jonathan Anomaly, Collective Action and Individual Choice: Rethinking How We Regulate
Narcotics and Antibiotics, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 752 (2013).
46. A. Ghafur et al., The Chennai Declaration: A Roadmap to Tackle the Challenge of Antimicrobial
Resistance, 50 INDIAN J. CANCER 71 (2013).
2017] 1011ETHICS, ANTIBIOTICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
antibiotics, since they operate globally and ship their (often illegal) products
around the world.
Along with requiring physician prescriptions for antibiotics, many agree that
we should ban the use of antibiotics as growth promoters in agriculture and
require a physician prescription when farmers want to use antibiotics to treat
disease. While this may seem like an obvious way of solving the prisoner’s
dilemma created by unrestricted access to antibiotics as growth promoters, it
also creates a new one: the reclassification by farmers of antibiotics as treat-
ments rather than enhancements. Evidence from Denmark, the first country to
ban antibiotics as growth promoters, suggests that although total use has
declined, prophylactic use has increased.47 This problem would likely be far
worse in other parts of the world, like China and the United States, where
animal welfare standards are lower.48 The reason this is a problem is that
conditions on factory farms are often so bad that antibiotics might actually be
needed as a prophylactic treatment even if their use as growth promoters is
forbidden. In other words, unless governments require farmers to treat animals
as more than mere meat machines to pack together in cruel and often unhy-
gienic conditions, imposing mandatory prescriptions for antibiotics may do little
if anything to prevent widespread antibiotic use on farms.
Another policy is to tax all antibiotics used in agriculture, in addition to
banning their use as growth promoters. Pigovian taxes attempt to tax socially
costly activities so that those who create the costs internalize them. The idea
motivating this strategy is that we can thereby minimize socially inefficient
externalities and use money generated by the tax to compensate victims or fund
programs aimed at mitigating the harm.49 A perennial problem with Pigovian
taxes is that the information needed to calibrate them is often complex or
unavailable—and in this case the information would change over time as new
resistance patterns emerge and new treatments become available. A simpler
alternative is to impose user fees on antibiotics.50 The justification is similar, but
rather than requiring scientists or policymakers to calculate the precise social
costs (and benefits) of using any particular antibiotic, we can impose a flat fee,
which might vary for different classes of antibiotics. The goal is to make the fee
high enough that it deters relatively inefficient uses, but not so high that animals
with serious infections—especially infections that arise through no fault of a
farmer—cannot be treated.
47. Denmark keeps meticulous data on the agricultural use of antibiotics and posts it on DANMAP,
http://www.danmap.org/downloads/reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/PQ5U-ZL8M] (last visited June 23,
2017).
48. I discuss this point and its implications in detail in Anomaly, supra note 17.
49. Evidence suggests Pigovian taxes are much more popular than general taxes, provided the
revenue really does go to addressing the source of the problem. See Steffen Kallbekken et al., Do You
Not Like Pigou, or Do You Not Understand Him?: Tax Aversion and Revenue Recycling in the Lab, 62
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53 (2011).
50. Aidan Hollis & Ziana Ahmed, Preserving Antibiotics, Rationally, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2474
(2013).
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User fees are also a good idea for the human use of antibiotics for the same
reasons: if people (or insurance companies) have to pay a higher price for a
drug, they will likely think twice before buying it. The fees can then be used to
fund basic science research associated with antibiotic resistance, infection
diagnosis, vaccines, and so on. But no policy is perfect. A user fee will have less
effect on limiting demand in health care systems that rely on third-party payers,
like insurance companies and governments, than it would if individuals paid
their own costs. The effect may still be positive if government-run health
systems impose the fees on users, and if insurance companies pass (at least part
of) the fee onto consumers. One worry about user fees is that although they
might discourage low-value use of antibiotics for ordinary people, they might
price poor people who actually need antibiotics out of the market, while wealthy
consumers remain insensitive to price increases.51 These unintended conse-
quences are worth bearing in mind, but also apply to all pollution taxes. They
are not an argument against user fees, but a reason to avoid making such fees
too large.
We have already seen why most people are rationally ignorant about the
problem of antibiotic resistance. One of the cheapest ways to mitigate resistance
is to fund information campaigns for both physicians and patients. The most
effective information to convey to patients through mass media and in health
care facilities concerns the cost to individuals and their children of overusing
antibiotics. If people understood that by overusing antibiotics they become
reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant bacteria that might come back to harm them
later, they might be more reluctant to use antibiotics every time they have a cold
and might think twice before getting trivial surgeries (such as cosmetic surger-
ies). Many people are beginning to understand that hospitals can be dangerous
places to visit because they typically have very high rates of MRSA (methicillin-
resistant staph aureus) and other resistant bacteria. Even outside hospitals,
people are more likely to acquire a c. difficile infection the longer or more often
they take antibiotics. All of these exposures can cause serious health problems,
including death, but most people do not factor them into their decisions to use
antibiotics. Some patients will also be motivated to reduce unnecessary use if
they know they are contributing to a process that harms others. Information
campaigns aimed at consumers already seem to have had a significant effect in
many Western countries,52 including the United States, and such campaigns are
far easier to justify than paternalistic campaigns aimed at decreasing cigarette
and recreational drug use.
Common physicians and surgeons cannot keep up with every medical ad-
vance and have little ability to understand the details of changing patterns of
resistance. They too are rationally ignorant about most facets of modern medi-
cine, though they certainly have stronger incentives to pay attention to epidemio-
51. O’Neill et al., supra note 13, at 67.
52. GELBAND et al., supra note 15, at 35–37.
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logical trends than their patients do. So there may be reasons for hospitals and
organizations like the American Medical Association to adjust medical curricula
to ensure that physicians understand the problem, and for governments to
provide feedback to high-volume prescribers. At the very least, government
agencies like the U.S. Centers for Disease Control are in a good position to fund
surveillance programs so that physicians, hospitals, and clinics have a sense of
the broader patterns of resistance outside of their own private practices.
C. Alternatives
Prescription requirements, user fees, and information campaigns can help
decrease demand for low-value uses of antibiotics. But the main thing policymak-
ers should focus on is basic science research—funded at least in part by
antibiotic user fees—that is likely to lead to breakthrough treatments and
diagnostics.
One of the main reasons for inefficient prescription is that very few bacterial
infections can be detected quickly and precisely. Patients in hospitals or commu-
nity clinics show up with a set of symptoms, and physicians often prescribe
broad-spectrum antibiotics hoping to kill off whatever infection the patient has.
This is extremely wasteful since it means many different species of bacteria are
targeted at once, most of them non-pathogenic. This elevates the risk that some
strains will develop and spread resistance, and also minimizes the chances of
targeting the right bacteria (assuming the patient has a bacterial infection, which
is often not the case). There is a strong public goods rationale, then, for funding
basic science research that might eventually translate to faster, more accurate
diagnostic tools. The benefits go to all potential antibiotic users and all potential
victims of bacterial infections—which is to say, everyone.
Another way to reduce demand for antibiotics is to stimulate the development
of vaccines for bacterial infections like tuberculosis and gonorrhea, some strains
of which are now resistant to all antibiotics. A related possibility is immuno-
enhancements through genetic engineering, which new technologies like CRISPR
could enable in coming decades. Prevention is the cheapest medicine, but in the
case of vaccines and genetic engineering prevention requires quite a bit of
scientific knowledge that private firms are not always in the best position to
produce.
Finally, new strategies for treating bacterial infections are being explored—
ranging from phage therapy (which uses viruses to attack pathogenic bacteria)
to technology that disrupts bacterial communication or otherwise inhibits viru-
lence.53 Once again, these advances are facilitated by publicly-financed basic
science research, much of which occurs at university labs.
53. Joseph Gerdt & Helen Blackwell, Competition Studies Confirm Two Major Barriers That Can
Preclude the Spread of Resistance to Quorum-Sensing Inhibitors in Bacteria, 9 ACS CHEMICAL
BIOLOGY 2291 (2014).
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CONCLUSION
Because resistance is a global problem, people in each state have a strong
interest in how people in other states use antibiotics. This suggests that a global
treaty may be required to adequately address the problem.54 In the case of
climate change, unilateral action to reduce greenhouse gasses can sometimes be
counterproductive. For example, as the United States uses more environmentally-
friendly natural gas (made possible by hydraulic fracturing technology), Ameri-
can (and Australian) companies now export more coal to China, which tends to
burn it in a way that causes more pollution, given its lower environmental
standards. This means that global emissions of carbon dioxide could rise rather
than fall. At the very least it shows that unilateral action can produce unintended
negative consequences (though it is important to emphasize that collective
action that slows economic growth also produces unintended negative
consequences—a point often overlooked by those who endorse sweeping restric-
tions on fossil fuel use).
The same is true of antibiotic resistance, though to a lesser extent. The
greenhouse gasses that affect global temperature mix evenly in the atmosphere,
but antibiotic resistance can, to some extent, be concentrated in local areas.
Over time, bacteria move across borders due to trade and travel. But at any
given time, people living in a particular country disproportionately bear the cost
of the misuse of antibiotics in people and agriculture. This suggests that each
country incurs enough of the cost of resistance to justify some unilateral efforts
at antibiotic conservation, even if we would all be better off if all countries
made an effort to coordinate with a global treaty.
As we learn more about the microbiome, people will have stronger prudential
reasons to figure out which bacteria they are colonized by (and should be
colonized by) and stronger moral reasons to make sure their children’s micro-
biomes are healthy. Some people will presumably choose to ignore this informa-
tion, just as many people today use antibiotics without understanding how they
work or what effects they have. Since we do not have a right to act in ways that
significantly elevate the risk of collective harms, we cannot use ignorance as an
excuse for making choices that put others at risk (even if our ignorance is, in the
economic sense, rational). Antibiotics should be regulated to minimize the
problem of resistance. But doing so is a difficult problem that will require us to
look to the distant and unintended consequences of using antibiotics, and of
policies aimed at controlling antibiotic resistance.
54. See Richard Smith & Joanna Coast, Antimicrobial Resistance: a global response, 80 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 126 (2002); Jonny Anomaly, Combating Resistance: The Case for a Global
Antibiotics Treaty, 3 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 13 (2010); Kevin Outterson et al., Repairing the Broken
Market for Antibiotic Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 277 (2015). While I still endorse a treaty, the pricing
and patent mechanisms I advocated earlier strike me as overly simplistic. I now think the main
priorities should be pressuring developing countries to conserve existing antibiotics by requiring
prescriptions and minimizing their agricultural use, and encouraging all countries to fund basic science
by awarding grants to researchers on a competitive basis.
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